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ABSTRACT Over the past decades we have witnessed a tremendous growth in the number of
strategic technology alliances and a growing importance of interﬁrm collaboration in the high-
tech sectors. The literature on these topics has grown accordingly. In this respect, our paper
serves two aims. One is to provide an overview of the consensus on key issues in this vast body of
literature. Second is to identify some major gaps in this literature that may inform future
research. In serving these aims, we ﬁrst discuss the dominant structuralist perspective that
stresses the role of embeddedness, but which also reﬂects a deterministic stance as if ﬁrms are
subject to an exogenous structure. In contrast, we also explore a more voluntaristic view of how
ﬁrms may possibly shape their network in view of achieving their strategic aims. This view also
seems better able to capture change and network dynamics, an issue that has been largely
ignored by the structuralist view.
1. Introduction
Over the past decades we have witnessed a tremendous growth in the number of strategic
technology alliances in the high-tech sectors. Especially, the number of alliances aimed at
technological learning and knowledge creation, has grown rapidly since the mid 1980s
(see Figure 1). We deﬁne strategic technology alliances as ‘cooperative agreements for
reciprocal technology sharing and joint undertaking of research between independent
actors that keep their own corporate identity during the collaboration’.
1 They are strategic
in the sense that they affect the long-term goals of the companies such as knowledge acqui-
sition and technology development. To obtain these goals, strategic alliances and interﬁrm
networks are an effective organizational form that allows ﬁrms to combine and integrate
complementary knowledge and capabilities from a diversity of actors.
2
Firms tend to use these technology alliances to reduce costs of R&D, to transfer tech-
nology in order to improve innovative performance, to reduce time-to-market or to search
Technology Analysis & Strategic Management
Vol. 19, No. 2, 227–249, March 2007
Correspondence Address: Victor A. Gilsing, P.O. Box 513, 5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands. E-mail:
v.a.gilsing@tm.tue.nl


























































9for new technological opportunities.
3 In addition, they are also considered to be efﬁcient
vehicles for external knowledge acquisition.
4 In the last decade, research on alliances
has primarily focused on the question of why and when alliances are formed.
5 In other
words, the focus has been on the so-called exogenous factors that cause alliance formation.
Interdependence and complementarities have been addressed here as the most common
explanation for ﬁrms forming inter-organizational ties.
6 These resource dependency pers-
pectives
7 posit that external resource scarcity is the most important reason for engaging in
collaborative agreements.
8 As a consequence, networks increasingly provide an alternative
to a more self-contained form of organization or to ‘standard’ market transactions.
9
More recently, the strategic alliance literature has made progress in advancing our
understanding of how inter-alliance dynamics—the so-called endogenous factors—
affect the intent of creating, building and sustaining collaborative advantage through alli-
ance formation.
10 This endogenous dynamic refers to with whom speciﬁcally alliances are
formed.
11 This reﬂects the embeddedness perspective which views alliance networks as
networks of social relations. Embeddedness refers to the structure of a network of
social relations that can affect the ﬁrm’s economic action, outcomes and behaviour and
that of its partners to whom it is directly or indirectly linked.
12
The combined body of research on both exogenous and endogenous reasons of alliance
formation has shown that a ﬁrm’s embeddedness in networks matters for its economic and
innovative action, and that it positively affects corporate performance in terms of
growth,
13 speed of innovation,
14 organizational learning
15 and reputation.
16 So, the litera-
ture has arrived at consensus concerning the reasons why and how alliance networks are
formed, and their associated positive effects on ﬁrms. However, two major shortcomings
can be observed here. One is that the received wisdom in the literature reﬂects a rather
deterministic stance as if ﬁrms are subject to an exogenous network structure that
unilaterally directs their behaviour and performance. Another shortcoming is that it
reﬂects a static view and ignores change in alliances networks and the antecedents and
consequences of this change.
Figure 1. Growth in the number of alliances

























































9To address these shortcomings, this paper aims to provide an overview of the most
recent literature on interﬁrm networks and innovation by the following two steps. One
is to provide an overview of agreement on key issues as advanced by the literature.
Second is to identify some major gaps in this literature that may inform future research.
A central theme in our analysis is formed by the debate in the literature on what constitutes
an optimal network structure, once it has been formed. As we will show, there are two
opposed views here: the social capital view of Coleman vs the structural hole view of
Burt.
17 Our key argument is that each view contains validity under speciﬁc conditions.
We will explore this role of conditions, on the one hand, by building on the existing litera-
ture that considers how alliance networks constrain and shape ﬁrm action and, on the other
hand, by examining how ﬁrms may shape these alliance network structures. Given the vast
body of literature dealing with networks, an important limitation is that we conﬁne our-
selves to the academic literature that deals with strategic technology alliances from the
perspective of learning and innovation.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the central debate in the
literature between two opposed views on how ﬁrms may optimally beneﬁt from
network embeddedness. This debate forms the basis for the subsequent sections in
which we explore the role of conditions regarding their implications for optimal
network embeddedness. To differentiate between conditions, we distinguish between
three levels of analysis, namely the group-, the network- and industry-level (see Figure 2).
Based on this differentiation, we analyse how each level may inform us on the vali-
dity of two views vis-a `-vis one another. Therefore, we focus in Section 3 on the group
level by discussing group-based competition and cooperation. In Section 4, we discuss
the role of the industry level by differentiating between exploration and exploitation.
In this respect, Sections 3 and 4 reﬂect a more deterministic stance as if ﬁrms are
subject to an exogenous structure that unilaterally shapes possibilities for learning
and innovation. To counter this, Section 5 then takes the reverse perspective by con-
sidering the dynamics of networks, where we consider how network characteristics and
industry conditions may change through acts of ﬁrms. Here we discuss how explora-
tion and exploitation build on each other and how this may be induced by ﬁrm action.
In this respect, Section 5 reﬂects a more voluntaristic perspective and we will explore
how far it sheds new light on the validity of the two opposed views on network
Figure 2. Conceptual model for differentiating between various levels of analysis

























































9optimality. Finally, in Section 6, we come up with our main ﬁndings and draw a
number of conclusions.
2. Two Views on Optimality of Network Embeddedness
A central debate in the network literature is on how network structures, once formed, facili-
tate theattainmentofdesiredoutcomesfortheirmembers.Thekeyquestionhere iswhether
networks should be sparse or dense, or put differently, whether ties should be redundant or
non-redundant. On the one hand, we ﬁnd the structural hole theory of Burt
18 which
claims that ﬁrms can reap rents from the absence of ties among its contacts. According to
Burt, there are costs associated with maintaining contacts and therefore efﬁciency can be
created in the network by shedding off redundant ties and selectively maintaining only a
limited set of ties that bridge ‘structural holes’. This view is at odds with the social capital
theory of Coleman
19 who claims that ﬁrms beneﬁt from cohesive (or redundant) ties with
their alliance partners. According to Coleman, density (or ‘closure’) facilitates the role of
social capital that allows for reputation effects, trust, social norms and social control.
In both claims, and in their normative implications, we can observe a strong universa-
listic tone, which abstracts from any kind of context. As we consider network embedded-
ness from a perspective of learning and innovation, the universal nature of these claims is
in contrast with arguments as advanced by evolutionary economics. Here it is argued that
processes of learning and innovation are subject to selection forces by the institutional
environment and that selection is assumed to take place in relation to the distinctive struc-
ture of this institutional environment, reﬂecting the assumption of local optimality instead
of universal optimality.
20 As a consequence, it may not come as a surprise that in this
debate between Burt’s view and Coleman’s view, the empirical evidence is mixed.
McEvily and Zaheer found evidence against redundancy in an advice network, for the
acquisition of capabilities.
21 Ahuja on the other hand found evidence against structural
holes, for innovation in collaboration.
22 Walker, Kogut and Shan in their study found evi-
dence in favour of cohesion, for innovation in biotechnology.
23 In view of these apparently
inconsistent ﬁndings, subsequent studies have taken a ‘contingency’ approach,
24 investi-
gating environmental conditions that would favour one view over the other.
25 In other
words, the two views on optimality may well both be true as their value seems to vary
in different settings or in the context of different tasks or purposes.
26 In other words,
the question is not so much ‘who is right’, but ‘who is right under which conditions’?
Unfortunately, systematic insights in which type of condition is relevant and how they
inﬂuence network optimality have remained absent in the literature until now. Therefore,
we will explore the question of what kind of condition is relevant and how they may
inform us on the validity of each view. Based on that we will formulate a number of prop-
ositions that may serve as suggestions for future research.
27
3. Introduction to Group-based Competition
The embeddedness perspective has especially focused on cooperation but has largely
ignored the competitive tension among alliances. In this section we focus on such competi-
tive aspects. More speciﬁcally, we focus on groups of partners that compete with other
groups within the same industry. We therefore take on a group level perspective and we
will abstract from the industry- and network level (see Figure 3).

























































93.1. General Background and Converging Insights
The rapid increase of strategic technology alliances has set in a new era of external
technology competition among networks of multiple alliances. It is now commonplace
to observe technological competition between ﬁrms in a group, linked via alliances,
against another alliance group. Research by Gomes-Casseres and by Doz and Hamel is
among the ﬁrst to have explored the increasing frequency of technology collaboration
as a reﬂection of a fundamental shift from the traditional form of competition of dyadic
alliances (ﬁrm vs ﬁrm) to a new form of multiple alliances (group vs group).
28 In this
way, these scholars have provided a base for this largely unexplored ﬁeld of study.
However, as global competition continues to intensify, a more comprehensive understand-
ing of this new form of group-based technological rivalry is necessary.
29 Research so far
has largely focused on the mixed motives of ‘competition plus cooperation (co-opetition)’
in alliances and its implications for dependence, trust and mutual beneﬁt, or has examined
the implications of trust, opportunism, partner rivalry and sustained cooperation as a
means of achieving competitive beneﬁts.
30 Despite its insightful focus on the alliance
as a vehicle for ‘co-opetition’, this line of research has not yet begun to incorporate the
external competitive environment in which alliances compete.
Today, ‘competition through cooperation’ has become the foundation of a ﬁrm’s
attempt to gain innovation and learning advantages through technology competition
among networks of multiple alliances, especially in high tech sectors. By establishing
multiple collaborative agreements, ﬁrms tend to compete intensely with each other in
several areas they are active in, resulting in ‘co-opetition’ behaviour.
31 Thus, a ﬁrm’s alli-
ances can be instruments to withstand competition—by making enemies partners—but
can also impose stronger competition on others, as winning the alliance race entails
access to better partners, resources or patents.
32 As these cooperative technology agree-
ments among competitors proliferate,
33 technology competition becomes an indispensable
part of a ﬁrm’s strategy. This actual explosion of collaborative agreements has led to a new
form of competition: group vs group rather than company vs company.
34 See also Figure 4,
which provides an illustration of the microelectronics industry.
Figure 3. Focus on group-level

























































9An important reason behind the formation of these technology-driven constellations is
typically related to technology competition. Technology competition takes the form of
multiple partners, i.e. ﬁrms linked with each other through strategic alliances in groups
or constellations
35 ‘competing against other groups and against traditional independent
ﬁrms’.
36 Through multiple R&D collaboration in alliance blocks, innovators can
capture the full beneﬁt of their innovative activity through spillovers and externalities,
as they now are able to share the costs and revenues of R&D projects, which can serve
as an incentive to conduct further R&D.
37 Other reasons that lead to group formation
entail establishing industry standards, as a result of standard battles between ﬁrms, as
well as (re)positioning strategies of companies.
38 A common theme behind these motiv-
ations is taking advantage of economies of scale and scope.
39 However, as global compe-
tition continues to intensify, a more thorough understanding of this new form of group-
based technological rivalry is required.
40
The force underlying such group formation can best be understood in terms of the social
capital view as endorsed by Coleman. His argument suggests that being part of a dense and
redundant network is advantageous for innovative performance, because it involves trust
and cooperation among its members in view of joint innovative efforts. Relying on other
players in the group gives better chances for innovative renewal as a result of spillover
effects, which enables block members to tap into each other’s knowledge base. In this
way block members exploit and deepen their existing capabilities by linking up with
Figure 4. Alliance blocks in the microelectronics industry

























































9ﬁrms in their own technology cluster to improve their innovative performance. At the
same time, however, such strong coherence within groups may lead to competition
between groups. This leads to the question what are such competitive effects of these pro-
cesses of group formation?
3.2. Unsettled Issues
A relatively understudied phenomenon in the embeddedness perspective is that alliance
formation is not only driven by cooperation between ﬁrms, but also by the internal compe-
titive tension among alliances. Here the academic literature has generally focused on bilat-
eral (dyadic) alliances. In examining this relationship between competition and
cooperation, research has largely focused upon the characteristics of the individual alli-
ance, arguing that it is important to acknowledge the mixed-motive nature of ‘competition
plus cooperation’ (co-opetition) of alliances and its implications for dependence, trust, and
mutual beneﬁt. Here, research has either focused on the performance/ﬁnancial beneﬁts of
alliance formation
41 or examined the implications of trust, opportunism, partner rivalry,
and sustained cooperation as a means of achieving competitive beneﬁts.
42 Although this
approach has served to advance our understanding of such internal competitive impli-
cations considerably, it ignores the external competitive implications of alliance relation-
ships. In other words, despite its insightful focus on the alliance itself, this line of research
has been primarily introspective. It has not yet begun to incorporate the external competi-
tive environment in which alliances compete, namely the competitive effects of alliance
network formation processes on partners and competitors at the group level. Understand-
ing these issues is important as they have substantial implications for the competitive
dynamics of technology-based industries. This means we have to include the external
competitive environment in which alliances compete by investigating the competitive
effects of alliance network formation at the group level.
To address how alliance group formation induces a competitive effect on rival groups,
we differentiate between a competitive effect in terms of the degree to which rival’s oppor-
tunities to form alliances are foreclosed and in terms of the degree to which the resource
base available to industry participants decreases.
43 Following the two opposed views as
endorsed by Burt and Coleman, we distinguish between two types of strategies and will
analyse the implications of each strategy for both types of competitive effects.
When following Burt’s recommendations, ﬁrms should create access to non-redundant
ties. In other words, they should invest in contacts beyond the group. There may be two
possibilities here, namely to engage in downstream or in upstream alliances. Downstream
alliances link ﬁrms in technology-based industries to sources of complementary assets
downwards in the value chain, often in view of commercialization of technology. An
example is the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry in which small, technology-
oriented biotech ﬁrms cooperate with large pharmaceutical companies that ‘own’ distri-
bution channels and/or marketing expertise. Here, these types of alliances typically do
not pose a high foreclosure risk to their rivals, as large pharmaceutical ﬁrms often maintain
alliances with lots of different biotech ﬁrms simultaneously. Moreover, these marketing
and distribution activities are very scale- and scope intensive, which forms an economic
argument why these downstream ﬁrms have to work together with multiple and different
players in the industry. Hence, as a result of spillovers, these alliances increase the
resources available to partners and rivals in the industry. In other words, extending

























































9the alliance portfolio with downstream alliances is likely to have a limited effect on the
competitive intensity in the industry. We therefore suggest the following proposition:
Proposition 1: If an alliance block extends its alliance portfolio with downstream
alliances in order to commercialize technology or increase accessibility to distri-
bution channels, this is likely to have a limited effect on the competitive intensity
in the industry.
Upstream vertical alliances can be formed by allying with universities or other research
institutions to create access to novel sources of state-of-the-art technological expertise.
This results in an infusion of scientiﬁc input into the industry, which expands the resource
base and lowers the competitive intensity. However, because of lack of scale and scope
economies in research projects, universities generally do not collaborate with more than
one biotech ﬁrm at a time. In this way, it is unlikely that spillovers will occur to the
rivals of the allying ﬁrms and as a consequence, partners of the allying ﬁrms cannot
beneﬁt from the knowledge available. In the case of biotechnology, biotech ﬁrms’ exclu-
sive alliances with upstream partners, such as universities and research institutes, foreclose
that their rivals can access those partners, which has an increasing effect on the competi-
tive intensity in the industry.
44 Thus, if an alliance block extends its alliance portfolio with
upstream alliances (to research institutions) in order to get access to leading edge technol-
ogy, this is likely to have a more moderate effect on the competitive intensity in the indus-
try, when compared with downstream alliances. Our second proposition therefore reads as
follows:
Proposition 2: If an alliance block extends its alliance portfolio with upstream
alliances (e.g.researchinstitutions)inordertogetaccesstoleading-edgetechnology,
this is likely to have a moderate effect on the competitive intensity in the industry
Incontrast,followingColeman’sview,itisarguedthatﬁrmsshouldreplicatetieswithintheir
group in view of the build up of social capital. This entails the creation of alliances that link
ﬁrms to others in the industry, horizontally across value chains. In comparison to the up- or
downstream(vertical)alliancesasmentionedabove,thesealliancesdonottapintoresources
outside of the focal industry. Horizontal alliances thus have no productive effect on the
resources available to the industry.
45 Moreover, as the number of horizontal alliances with
the same partner type increases, this may lead to a situation of strategic gridlock
46 where
the number of eligible partner diminishes as a result of overcrowding in this ﬁeld.
47 Rivals
thus face a rapidly shrinking pool of eligible and desirable partners, which increases the
competitive dynamics in the industry.
48 Therefore, we suggest our third proposition:
Proposition 3: If an alliance block extends its alliance portfolio with horizontal
alliances (competitors), this is likely to have a major effect on the competitive
intensity in the industry
4. Role of Context: Exploration and Exploitation
In this section we focus on the industry level and discuss its role by differentiating between
exploration and exploitation, cf. March’s distinction.
49 More speciﬁcally we are interested

























































9in how these conditions affect the possibilities for learning and innovation for ﬁrms, and
which view on the role of network embeddedness (Burt vs Coleman) has most relevance
here (see Figure 5).
4.1. General Background and Converging Insights
In the literature, there is mounting empirical evidence that the speciﬁc relationship








55 More recently, some studies have started to unravel this
notion of embeddedness in order to understand in what speciﬁc ways it contributes to a
ﬁrm’s innovation performance. Here, characteristics of partners have been studied such
as their innovativeness
56 as well as the properties of alliances such as the role of formal
governance mechanisms, equity vs non-equity alliances
57 or the role of repeated con-
tacts.
58 Beyond the dyad level, studies at the network level have shown that the properties
of an alliance network also affect innovation. Here it has been shown that apart from the
number of direct ties
59 also a ﬁrm’s indirect ties
60 and the redundancy among these ties
61
affect its innovation performance.
Following these studies, the prevailing ‘embeddedness logic’ entails the insight that
alliance formation is based on building preferential relationships characterized by trust,
stability and rich exchange of information between partners.
62 It is asserted that
network formation proceeds through the formation of new relationships, building on the
experience with existing ﬁrm ties. By investing in these social relations through the repli-
cation of their existing ties, ﬁrms build up social capital.
63 So, embeddedness and the
social capital derived from that are thus by their very nature dependent on history.
64
Social capital generates returns as it enables ﬁrms to access and capture the embedded
Figure 5. Focus on the industry level

























































9resources in their social relations.
65 In this way the network becomes a growing repository
of information on the availability, reputation, competencies and reliability of prospective
partners.
66 In most of these studies, alliances are characterized as channels for the diffu-
sion and sharing of technological knowledge. Alliances are considered as a mechanism





70 In other words, an important function of alliances
is that they function as ‘pipelines’ through which information and knowledge ﬂows
between ﬁrms.
71
This focus on the diffusion potential of alliances may not be surprising, as implicit in
most studies on the role of embeddedness is that it has been understood under conditions
of relative environmental stability. Here, embeddedness refers to routinization and stabil-
ization of linkages among members as a result of a history of exchanges and relations
within a group or community.
72 Under such structure-reinforcing conditions, the role of
embeddedness is increasingly well understood.
73 These conditions connect with
March’s category of exploitation in which environmental uncertainty is rather limited
and the focus is on the reﬁnement and extension of existing competences and technol-
ogies.
74 The rationale for teaming up with partners then is formed by possibilities to
obtain complementary know-how
75 and/or to speed up the R&D process in industries
where time to market is crucial. Here, cooperation is attractive as partners have a good
understanding of the relevant issues at hand
76 and alliances enable a rapid diffusion
among partners, enhancing the efﬁciency and speed of cooperation.
77 This raises the ques-
tion how to understand the role of network embeddedness in view of exploration that can
be characterized by a break away from the established way of doing things, with a focus on
the discovery and experimentation of new technologies.
78
4.2. Exploration: Unsettled Issues
By its nature, exploration is not about efﬁciency of current activities, but rather forms an
uncertain process that deals with the search for new, technology based business opportu-
nities,
79 which requires production of new insights and knowledge.
80 This points to a
different role of a ﬁrm’s alliance network, namely its recombination potential in view
of new knowledge creation rather than its function as a channel for diffusion of existing
information and knowledge in view of exploitation. Existing literature has largely
ignored this role of alliances for novelty creation and is therefore unable to explain the
development of new knowledge and competencies.
81 Therefore it seems to be very import-
ant to create a better understanding of the context of exploration and to study its effects on
optimal network embeddedness.
Following Schumpeter, new combinations can be considered as to originate from the
recombination of both existing and novel parts of knowledge.
82 This implies that for
exploration of such novel combinations, a ﬁrm’s alliance network needs to bear an
inherent tension in it, as ﬁrms are faced with a dual task. On the one hand, they need to
develop access to cognitively distant sources of knowledge and in this way create
access to novelty. This requires an emphasis on diversity and disintegrated network struc-
tures, which is related to Burt’s argument stressing the beneﬁts of access to non-redundant
contacts to obtain novel information.
83 This has been stressed in the literature thus far.
84
On the other hand though, ﬁrms need to make sure that such novel knowledge, once
accessed, is evaluated and when proven to be valuable, is adequately absorbed and

























































9related to its existing knowledge base and skills.
85 This process seemingly favours more
homogenous network structures in view of integrating the diverse inputs obtained from
distant partners.
86 Here, a dense structure enables a rapid diffusion across partners and
in this way supports possibilities for ‘triangulation’. In this way, the value of the acquired
novelty can be assessed, which enhances an efﬁcient absorption.
87 Moreover, such a dense
structure creates a potential for social control, based on informal mechanisms such as
social norms, reputation and so on, to prevent opportunistic behaviour, which is important
for this absorption process. This is more in line with Coleman’s view stressing the beneﬁts
of redundant network structures.
88
This combination of redundant ties and non-redundant ties in view of for exploration is
overlooked in the literature thus far. In earlier studies, the effect of non-redundant ties was
considered,
89 however, without taking into account in how far this effect was conditioned
by existing strong ties. Our arguments imply that there is only an effect of non-redundant
ties in exploration when a ﬁrm also disposes of ‘sufﬁcient’ redundant ties, indicating that
in exploration it is the combination of existing, redundant ties and new, non-redundant ties
that pays off.
90 Apparently, apart from a Burt ‘rent in exploration’, we anticipate that there
may also well be a Coleman ‘rent at work’. This suggests the following proposition:
Proposition 4: Under conditions of exploration, the use of non-redundant ties will
be most effective in combination with redundant ties.
4.3. Exploitation: Unsettled Issues
In exploitation, the focus is on the reﬁnement and strengthening of its existing technology
base and competencies. In general, in exploitation, dominant designs have emerged and
technological and market uncertainty have decreased.
91 This enables the codiﬁcation of
product knowledge that diffuses more widely across the industry.
92 This makes process
innovation an important way to achieve competitive advantage, leading to a focus on
more incremental, process-based innovations.
93 Firms pursuing such a strategy might
need speciﬁc and more ﬁne-grained information that will provide a deeper knowledge
of the particular process technology. Such process innovations generally entail more
tacit knowledge that is best exchanged within more durable relations and trust-based
relations.
94 Their partners have to be trusted before they can touch the ‘heart’ of the
company, especially in the case of core technology. Moreover, in exploitation there is gen-
erally a stronger focus on competition so that potential partners may also be potential com-
petitors. Exploitation therefore seems to favour Coleman’s closure argument, stressing the
beneﬁts for redundancy as it provides a potential for trust-building and social control.
Therefore we suggest the following proposition:
Proposition 5a: Under conditions of exploitation, the replication of existing ties in a
redundant network is most effective.
However, the relevance of Coleman’s closure argument seems to be only part of the full
story. In exploitation, considerations of efﬁciency are crucial, because competition has
shifted to competition on price, with new entrants in the emerging market.
95 As argued
by Burt, there are costs associated with maintaining contacts.
96 Therefore, the drive for
efﬁciency in exploitation requires the elimination of redundant relations. In other
words, there is a need for a less dense structure. The increased codiﬁcation of knowledge



























































remain relevant, who has those competencies, and who is likely to survive in the industry.
97
Investments shift to large-scale production, distribution systems and brand name, which are
all long-term, and increase in size and economic life. In view of such large and often sunk
investments, with a long economic life, and to maintain efﬁcient division of labour,
network structure is likely to be stable. This suggests the following proposition:
Proposition 5b: Under conditions of exploitation, a non-redundant network is most
effective.
Atﬁrstsight,propositions5aand5bseemtobeincontradiction.Proposition5astresses the
beneﬁts of redundancy in view of tacit knowledge exchange and trust building, conform
Coleman, whereas proposition 5b stresses the beneﬁts of non-redundancy in view of efﬁ-
ciency, which is in line with Burt’s considerations. Which of the two claims holds is difﬁ-
cult to tell upfront. In exploitation, evidence has been found both for the beneﬁts of
redundancy
98 as well as for non-redundancy.
99 Again, we anticipate that also for exploita-
tion there may be an industry effect at work in how exploitation ‘settles’ in speciﬁc indus-
tries. So, to verify these two contrasting propositions, it seems useful to bring in such an
industry perspective by studying in which industries ﬁrms generally favour social
control (redundancy) over efﬁciency (non-redundancy), or the other way around.
5. Firm’s Action: From Exploitation to Exploration
In this section we consider how network characteristics and industry conditions may
change through acts of ﬁrms. More speciﬁcally, we discuss how a move from exploitation
Figure 6. Effects of ﬁrms’ action on network level and industry level

























































9towards exploration may be induced by ﬁrm’s actions, reﬂecting a more voluntaristic view
(see Figure 6).
5.1. General Background and Converging Insights
Exploitation is generally considered to become dominant when technological variety that
emerges from exploration is reduced, for example in the case of the emergence of a domi-
nant design.
100 The establishment of such a dominant design signiﬁcantly lowers techno-
logical uncertainty in the sector. It generally leads to the emergence of a new technological
regime in which radical technological development is substituted by more focused, incre-
mental and cumulative improvements along a speciﬁc technological trajectory,
101 which is
competence enhancing.
102 This ‘supports’ the way the industry is functioning and the
bases of competition, increasingly reinforcing the existing status quo.
103 Basically, this
transition from exploration to exploitation can be considered as a ‘structure reinforcing
process’
104 with major consequences for the formation and functioning of alliance net-
works. Such a structure-reinforcing process at the industry level increasingly provides
pressures to conform to the status quo, in ‘organizational isomorphism’.
105
As argued in Section 4, under such relatively stable conditions of exploitation ﬁrms tend
to develop closed networks featuring strong, cohesive ties through frequent interaction.
Strong ties
106 are solid, reciprocal and trustworthy relationships. They tend to create a
large basis of trust and intimacy between the partners.
107 Since trust is an important
basis for knowledge sharing and joint learning, ﬁrms are expected to be more productive
in joint innovative activities. As those ﬁrms invest a substantial amount of time and energy
to establish these strong relationships, changing transaction partners in the short run is not
likely, since it involves substantial switching costs and implies the risk that existing
relationships will dissolve.
108 Thus, when trustworthy partners are readily available,
searching for or switching to new partners is difﬁcult and costly.
109 Firms rather replicate
their existing ties within their technological community than search for new ones.
110
Furthermore, this repeated alliance formation inan alliance networkbased on strong ties
through local search processes that characterize exploitation, leads the densely connected
ﬁrms to mimic behaviour and develop similar preferences.
111 Similarity can encourage
interaction and can be the cause of attraction. Scholars refer to this process as ‘interaction
breeds similarity’ and ‘similarity breeds attraction’.
112 So, in this process social capital
drives the network to self-organize, self-transform and self-reinforce. The network actu-
ally becomes a growing repository of information on the availability, reputation, compe-
tencies and reliability of prospective partners.
113 In other words, these are Coleman rents
‘pur sang’, from which ﬁrms may beneﬁt accordingly.
However,enjoyingsuchbeneﬁtsmaycomeatapriceasaseriousriskislurking.Theenabling
effectofembeddednessinallianceformationcanturnintoaparalysingeffectasthoseﬁrmsmay
b e c o m e‘ l o c k e di n t o ’t h e s ec l o s e dp a r t so ft h en e t w o r k :t h e yo n l yr e l yo np a r t n e r si nt h e i ro w n
closed social system




will diminish and potentially even disappear altogether.
The interesting question now is how one gets away from such over-embeddedness as
well as from the existing dominant designs in technology and prevailing dominant
logics of organization and competition.

























































95.2. Unsettled Issues: From Exploitation to Exploration
Here we focus on the question of how ﬁrms can make the transition from a sole focus on
exploitation towards a focus on exploration. In various strands of literature there is still a
strong focus on the role of ‘local’ search for organizational knowledge, reﬂecting exploi-
tation. Evolutionary theory strongly emphasizes this path-dependent search for organiz-
ational knowledge that closely relates to past R&D outcomes and activity.
116 In the
innovation literature, there is dominant focus on the working out of novelty, towards a
‘dominant design’, and in doing this transition process from exploitation to exploration
is largely neglected.
Recently, some recent studies have elucidated that ﬁrms need to move beyond local
search and engage in exploration in order to stay competitive in the long run.
117 These
studies address the importance of creating access to distant and heterogeneous sources
of knowledge but have ignored how such access can be created and how this affects a
ﬁrm’s alliance network. So, an important issue now is to develop an attempt to go
inside the ‘black box’ of this transition process and to study how ﬁrms may move from
exploitation to exploration and what are the implications for their alliance network. As
a general idea one can argue that ﬁrms in exploitation need to move away from these
core rigidities in dense networks and engage in relations with non-redundant contacts.
Such partners may provide access to novel information,
118 which yields the potential
for exploration of such novel combinations,
119 In this respect, ﬁrms that line up with out-
siders may generate more opportunities for exploration than when replicating ties within
their existing technological ‘community’. We therefore propose to follow Burt here and
suggest the following proposition:
120
Proposition 6: When moving from exploitation to exploration, ﬁrms that create ties
that are non-redundant with their existing network will be more innovative than
ﬁrms that replicate existing ties.
A next question now is in how far possibilities to create non-redundant ties are equally
spread across ﬁrms in the alliance network. The network literature is quite inconclusive
about how network position inﬂuences the ability to form non-redundant ties. According
to one view, a move towards exploration instigates a structure-loosening process in which
a peripheral position would be more beneﬁcial.
121 Being at the periphery may be more
beneﬁcial as selection forces exerted by the existing network, such as the expectation of
loyalty and shared norms of reciprocity in the alliance group, are generally less stringent
here than in the group core.
122 As a consequence, a peripheral position may create more
possibilities for all kinds of leeway and to experiment with ties outside the group. More
central ﬁrms may not always have this option, as social pressure and loyalty to the existing
group may pre-empt them from doing this. Here, central ﬁrms need to make an explicit
trade-off between moving beyond their existing network to access new technology that
can enhance their innovative performance vs the disadvantage of negative reputation
effects that result from leaving. This may be especially difﬁcult for such centrally posi-
tioned ﬁrms given their commitments to existing partners and technology, and this may
be generally less the case for more peripheral ﬁrms. In this way, peripheral players may
more easily create access to new information, which implies greater opportunities for
learning. As a consequence, we can expect that the peripheral players are more innovative

























































9than their central counterparts, when moving from exploitation towards exploration. This
suggests the following proposition:
Proposition 7: When moving from exploitation towards exploration, peripheral
ﬁrms enjoy more opportunities to initiate the formation of non-redundant ties
than central ﬁrms.
When accessing novel knowledge through such non-redundant contacts, peripheral ﬁrms
may be able to create new combinations that can lead to the development of innovations
with potentially disruptive consequences for existing technology and dominant designs.
123
This may lead to a structure-loosening process in which established positions diminish in
importance as former central players, if they keep replicating existing ties, are increasingly
relegated towards the periphery. In contrast, former peripheral players may move towards
a newly emerging network core as they are more and more in the midst of action.
124 As a
consequence, the level of network centralization, i.e. the degree to which the network
shows a tendency of a single ﬁrm (or a limited number of ﬁrms) to be more central
than all others, will decrease when moving from exploitation towards exploration. Regard-
ing such consequences of ﬁrms’ actions for the network level, we suggest the following
proposition:
Proposition 8: When moving from exploitation towards exploration, network
centralization will decrease.
However, an opposing view may hold as well. According to this view, it may be easier for
central players to access novel information held by outsiders.
125 Central ﬁrms become
generally better informed about what is going on in the network.
126 Moreover, such
central players are more visible and powerful in the network and have more direct ties
than less central players. This enhances their status and attractiveness to others as their
central position serves as a signal of their qualities as well as their experience and
ability in strategic partnering.
127 For outsiders, i.e. ﬁrms that are non-redundant as seen
from the existing network, it may be attractive to cooperate with such high-status,
central ﬁrms as their status may spillover to them so that they gain in legitimacy.
128 In
this way, central ﬁrms can reinforce their centrality, which again leads to a further increase
of network centralization. Based on this, we suggest the following two propositions:
Proposition 9: When moving from exploitation towards exploration, central ﬁrms
enjoy more opportunities to initiate the formation of non-redundant ties than periph-
eral ﬁrms.
Proposition 10: When moving from exploitation towards exploration, network
centralization will increase.
In terms of the validity of the arguments of Burt vs Coleman, propositions 7 and 9 are fully
in line with one another. Both propositions clearly predict reﬂect a Burt rent when enga-
ging in non-redundant ties when moving towards exploration. The question is, however,
which position will be most advantageous to create such ties. This may again depend to
some extent on the type of industry. Moreover, another possibility may be that both
central and peripheral positions can engage in non-redundant contacts but that this will

























































9yield different outcomes. Being at the periphery generally implies that one is outside the
immediate sight of dominant and more central players. Because of this, selection forces to
comply with dominant designs and existing systems of production, organization, technical
standards and so on, may be somewhat less stringent. Hence, deviating from such prevail-
ing ‘industry recipes’
129 becomes easier.
130 As a consequence, ﬁrms at the periphery may
enjoy more freedom to experiment freely with different kinds of non-redundant partners.
In contrast, central ﬁrms may have large sunk costs in the existing technology and may
therefore explore to a more limited degree. Regarding such consequences of ﬁrms’
actions for the industry level, we suggest our ﬁnal proposition:
Proposition 11: When engaging in relations with non-redundant contacts, outcomes
of exploration by peripheral ﬁrms will be more disruptive when compared with their
central counter parts.
6. Summary and Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to provide an overview of the most recent literature on
strategic alliance networks with respect to interﬁrm learning and innovation. First we
have provided an overview of key issues in this vast body of alliance literature, while a
second step was to identify some major gaps in this literature that may inform future
research. In this respect, we refer to Figure 7 that schematically portrays what these two
steps have delivered.
As the ﬁgure shows, there is ample agreement on why and when alliances are formed
(exogenous factors), as well as on how and with whom (endogenous factors). Regarding
the role of endogenous driving forces, insights have meanwhile also converged regarding
the role of competition in bilateral alliances (dyadic perspective). The same applies to the
role of embeddedness, which has been increasingly well understood under conditions of
relative environmental stability. Overall this reﬂects the received wisdom in the literature
and it is here where most of the agreement can be found. Beyond this point, however, the
literature is still in strong disagreement what constitutes an optimal network structure once
it has been formed. According to the social capital view of Coleman, a dense network
structure is most beneﬁcial in situations when trust building, social control and recurrence
are important. In contrast, the structural hole view of Burt advances the beneﬁts of non-
dense, or non-redundant, network structures in view of efﬁciency and the possibilities
to create access to novel knowledge. In the literature, the empirical ﬁndings show a
mixed picture, with evidence pointing in both directions.
In this respect, a central claim of this paper is that both views may well be true but that
their validity is dependent upon the environmental context. Although several studies have
meanwhile acknowledged such a contingency argument,
131 systematic insights in relevant
conditions and in their speciﬁc effect on optimal network embeddedness are lacking. In
this paper we have discussed this role of speciﬁc conditions from two different angles.
One is that we followed the dominant view in the literature that takes on a deterministic
perspective by considering how environmental conditions determine network optimality.
Here we differentiated betweenthe group-, network and industry-level. A second approach
was taken by developing a more voluntaristic view that aims to understand how such
environmental conditions may change through acts of ﬁrms. Moreover, we considered
the associated implications for optimal network embeddedness. Based on this combination
of views, we have reviewed the literature and identiﬁed four important gaps. Each gap

























































9speciﬁes conditions that may shed a different light on the validity of the claims by Burt and
Coleman. See Tables 1 and 2 that summarize the results of our analysis.
We can now draw a number of conclusions. One is that the literature has shown a bias to
understand the role of embeddedness under conditions of relative environmental stability.
In other words, embeddedness and network optimality are understood for exploitation but
remain in their infancy for exploration. This is a striking observation as the importance of
exploration is getting more and more important. Given the increasing rate of change that
characterizes most industries, existing technology obsoletes more rapidly and requires the
timely creation and development of new technology.
132 In other words, understanding the
role of embeddedness in view of exploration deserves a high priority on the future research
agenda. A second conclusion is that the two different views indeed seem to form opposites
that cannot be reconciled. However, conditions of exploration seem to form an exception
as a combined Burt–Coleman rent may be expected here. This is a novel insight that has
Figure 7. Overview of received wisdom and literature gaps

























































9been entirely absent in the existing literature with its focus on conditions of exploitation
and its emphasis on how the two views differ. A third conclusion is that exploring a more
voluntaristic view seems to have interesting future potential. It reﬂects a new perspective
on embeddedness as it counters the dominant structuralist view. As a consequence, it has
yielded several new directions for future research and we feel that it deﬁnitely reﬂects the
newest and most ‘exiting’ topics to advance our understanding of embeddedness in alli-
ance networks. One is that this view seems better able to capture change and network
dynamics, an issue that has been largely ignored by the structuralist view. Second is
that it considers network properties as dependent variables and in this way may explain
why non-redundant networks (‘structural holes’) or dense networks (‘closure’) emerge
in the ﬁrst place, apart from which of the two is more beneﬁcial. This connects with the
arguments by Salancik and Powell et al. that the literature has too long ignored such
‘why-questions’.
133 Taking a more voluntaristic approach as explored here, seems to
form a good starting point for that. Overall, we hope that we have been able to shed
more light on the issue of alliances and innovation under various different contexts.
Table 1. Relevance and implications of the two views according to levels of analysis






Who is right under
which conditions?




Coleman rent within group,










Only Burt rent (negative
effect of a social
capital view)
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Depends on the industry
under study
Table 2. Propositions according to levels of analysis and views on network optimality
Conditions
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